
























A THESIS IN THE JOHN MOLSON SCHOOL OF BUSINESS MASTER OF 




Presented in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Master of Science 
in Administration at Concordia University 
 
















































































































In this paper, I examine the effects of the arrival of phony public information originating 
from the United-States on a sample of Canadian stocks listed both on the Toronto Stock 
Exchange (TSE) and on the major U.S. exchanges. I find that following the news 
announcement the stocks on both markets instantaneously experience a similar, highly 
correlated and significant log return surge along with a disruption in liquidity and a 
widening of the spread. Using control stocks for the sample of firms, my results suggest 
that the transmission mechanism is exacerbated by the presence of cross-listed stocks on 
the U.S. exchanges. Overall, this empirical work shows that cross-listed stocks can act as 
vectors for shocks, or at least strengthen the transmission mechanism of a shock from the 
home (foreign) market to the foreign (home) market. It also suggests that firms may have 





































CROSS-LISTED STOCKS have been a subject of academic research for many years. Yet, it 
has come to my attention that most of the existing literature is concentrating on the benefits 
of cross-listings while very few studies mention its disadvantages. 
 
Observing a unique type of natural experiment; the arrival of a false news announcement of 
an unprecedented magnitude, this empirical work aims at documenting how cross-listed 
stocks can strengthen the transmission mechanism of a shock between markets. In this case, I 
am interested in a sample of Canadian cross-listed stocks in the United-States, two countries 
with integrated and interdependent economies. This natural experiment proves itself to be an 
ideal material to observe how the cross-listed stocks react and adjust to the release of the false 
news announcement. First, since it is a false news announcement, we are able to observe the 
beginning of the event as well as its end which therefore provides a contained window and 
makes it a purely exogenous event. Second, the chosen natural experiment originates from the 
United-States (the foreign market in our case) and represents the advantage to be a market 
event and not only a firm specific event. As described in the next section, the arrival of this 
false news announcement impacted not only the American financial markets but also the 
Canadian stock market of Toronto. The following section provides a complete description of 





Description of the natural experiment 
 
 
On April 23rd, 2013, at 1:07 p.m. Easter time, the Associated Press, an American not-for-profit 
news agency, releases the following tweet: "Breaking: Two Explosions in the White House and 
Barack Obama Injured." The Associated Press Twitter account having more than 1.9 million 






matter of seconds before this “bomb” caused panic on the stock market. Three minutes later and a 
new tweet from an executive from the Associated Press and it became clear that their Twitter 
account had been the target of hackers, presumably the Syrian Electronic Army (SEA). 
 
In an era where information travels at the speed of light and investors have access to high 
frequency trading, these three minutes were of course more than enough for investors to react 
swiftly to the news and for the stock markets to suffer from it. The Dow Jones index and the 
Toronto Stock Exchange both respectively lost 100 points and 35 points before recovering it 
once it was clear that it had only been a phony public information while some reports 
suggested that only on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) about $20 billion worth of 
equity trades had been made within these two minutes. 
 
As mentioned above, the Associated Press Twitter account being hacked represents an ideal 
material to study the effects of the arrival of phony public information. First, it would be 
difficult to refer to this event as being private information. After all, taking into account the 
1.9 million followers, the magnitude of the news announcement and the speed at which the 
news was spread on the Internet, we can safely state that there is no information asymmetry1 
among investors. Moreover, public information is by far a more comprehensive measure and 
cannot be reduced to firm-specific events2. Second, the two minutes window between the 
first tweet at 1:07 p.m. and the second one at 1:10 p.m. and the fact that the news was in the 
end no news allowed for the stock markets to rebound after the initial fall thus giving us a 







1 Dealing with public information allows to ignore the information asymmetry issue. For more 
discussion about its effects, see Klein, O’Brien and Peters (2002) and Kim and Verrecchia (1991).  





I mentioned above that the TSE lost about 35 points following the arrival of the hacked tweet 
which represents in terms of points a third of what the DOW lost. Although a fall in the U.S. 
exchanges is expected in such cases, I cannot help but wonder if there might be more to the 
reaction of the Toronto Stock Exchange than just the level of integration between the two 
countries. Is it due solely to the fact that these two economies and their respective financial 
markets are integrated3? Then are we facing a case of financial contagion as defined by 
 
Dornbusch, Park and Claessens (2000) where “the higher the degree of integration, the more 
extensive could be the contagion effects of a common shock or a real shock to another 
country.”? Or is it only interdependence as shown by Forbes and Rigobon4? While giving 
credit to both explanations, I believe that part of the answer might lie somewhere else: cross-
listed stocks. It is common knowledge that Canadian stocks account for the largest group of 
foreign stocks listed in the United States from a single country and that many if not most of 
them are being traded actively in both countries. Moreover, the TSE and the NYSE for 





One objective of this paper is to provide a straightforward intraday analysis of the 
price formation and liquidity of cross-listed stocks following the release of a very specific 
type of non-news news announcement. Furthermore, the very specific and singular nature of 
the news announcement chosen provides an interesting ground on which to study price 






3 Kodres and Pristker (1998) and Calvo and Mendoza (2000) both show that two countries will 
face higher risks of financial contagion given that they have more liquid financial markets and 
financial assets widely traded on global markets.
  





Another objective of this study is to investigate the role of cross-listing in the transmission 
mechanism of a shock from the home (foreign) market to its foreign (home) market. 
 
My findings support the notion of “informationally efficient international stock market” 
observed by Eun and Shim5 (1989). My results also suggest that stock prices on the TSE and 
the U.S. exchanges are cointegrated and mutually adjusting as documented by Eun and 
Sabherwal (2003). Where several studies (including Mitchell and Mulherin (1994) and Berry 
and Howe (1994)) fail to find a significant positive relationship between major public news 
announcements and large movements in price return, my results show a significant and 
instantaneous surge in price volatility in the first minutes after the news announcement. 
 
I believe this paper contributes to the existing literature on cross-border listings in 
two ways. First, it provides an intraday analysis of a very specific type of public information: 
a phony news announcement on an international scale relating to a matter of the outmost 
importance. Second, it highlights one major flaw of cross-listing among all the various 
benefits described over time in the existing literature. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the existing 
literature on the benefits of cross-listing. Section III gives a description of the data sources, 
sample details and the methods used to perform the analysis. In Section IV, I present the 












 Eun and Shim (1989) find evidence that among different stock markets, the Canadian exchanges 
respond most strongly when facing a shock origination from the United States. They find that most of 











The international cross-listings literature, as we know it, is quite extensive and 
surprisingly most of the academic studies done on the topic have focused on the benefits of 
cross-listing without giving much thought to its potential pitfalls. Studies such as Alexander, 
Eun and Janakiramanan (1987, 1988), Foerster and Karolyi (1993), Karolyi (1998)6 and 
Errunza and Miller (2000) all document a decline in cost of capital following cross-listings 
(mainly on the U.S. exchanges). Reduced cost of capital and the access to foreign capital used 
to be the main motivations behind cross-listing. For instance, the NYSE and NASDAQ both 
provide access to more liquid and efficient markets. Miller (1999) and more recently Baker, 
Nofsinger and Weaver (2002) advance increased analysts and media coverage and increased 
investors recognition as another major motivation which remind of Merton (1987) “shadow 
cost” being reduced since investors gain access to more information about stocks and 
decrease the riskiness of taking positions involving these stocks. 
 
Several other studies propose change in trading costs and governance as possible benefits of 
cross-listing. Foerster and Karolyi (1999) observe that bid-ask spreads in Canada decrease 
following cross-listings. Doidge et al. (2009) suggest that it can limit the ability of controlling 
shareholders to extract private benefits. 
 
On the other hand, very few studies have looked at the potential pitfalls of cross-listing. Eun and 












 take the risk of seeing these U.S. exchanges become the price discovery mechanism7. Facing 
constraints pertaining to laws, disclosure and possible enforcement actions by the Security 
Exchange Commission (SEC) also accounts for another potential issue when cross-listing as 
shown by Coffee (2002). Ironically, an increased analysts and media coverage can also be 
seen as a threat (Lang, Lins and Miller (2003)) since the gained exposure can harm the 
companies. For instance, companies might have to be more transparent about some opaque 
activities they have which in turn might be proven to be harmful for the company image. 
 
However, it has come to my attention that none of these studies had examined impact of 
cross-listings on one aspect of price discovery between the home (foreign) market and the 











The intraday data I use for the main core of my analysis is obtained from the 
Bloomberg database. It consists of bid and ask (end) prices as well as the trade orders from 
April 1 to April 23, 2013. The Canadian-U.S. intraday currency rates were also retrieved 
from Bloomberg. My data on market capitalization, four-digit SIC codes and trading volume 
(Table 1, Appendix A and B) comes from Compustat North America and the Center for 








 Lululemon Athletica (LLL) delisted from the Toronto Stock Exchange on June 2013 saying that they  
“believe that the minimal trading volume of its shares on the TSE no longer justifies the expenses 





My main sample of stocks consists of thirty-eight Canadian firms listed on the Toronto Stock 
Exchange (TSE) and on one of the major U.S. exchanges (NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX). 
 
In April 2013, there were 151 Canadian companies listed on the TSE and on one of the major 
U.S. exchange. I first dropped all the firms with less than six months of active trading and for 
which I did not have enough intraday data. Then, I excluded from my sample stocks with a 
daily trading volume inferior to 300,000 daily trades across both markets, firms whose stock 
market valuations were smaller than 500C$ million and finally; firms with a market stock 
price under one Canadian dollar. The final sample of stocks is described in Table 1. 
 
The sub-sample of stocks I use as a complementary part of my analysis is constituted 
exclusively of firms from the mining industry. Canadian firms with a four-digit SIC code 
ranging between 1000 and 1499 and meeting all the previous criteria were included in this 
sub-sample. Table IV gives a descriptive summary of the seventeen firms included in the sub-
sample along with the U.S. exchange they are listed on. 
 
Throughout this paper, I measure market returns as the log of price and use mid-quote bid-ask 
spread. For comparison purpose, all the prices are reported in Canadian dollars, based on 
closing Canada-US intraday exchange rate. 
 
My approach to analyzing price formation and liquidity is similar to the one used by 
Fleming and Remolona (1999); an intraday analysis of price change, trading volume and bid-
ask spread. Even though their approach was used to observe the reaction of treasury bonds 
following the arrival of public information on a regular basis, it also applies to the analysis of 
equity. I then proceed as Forbes and Rigobon (2002) in using cross-market correlation 







I also use a slightly different approach in measuring the cross-market correlation coefficients 




Where R represents the price return on both a non-event period also defined as “stable period” 
 
and on the day the news announcement was released and is the error term. Repeating the 
same process for both markets, I therefore obtain the error terms from each markets and 
regress them: 




I expect this approach to allow the error-term to capture the contagion component on both 
exchanges. Hence, regressing the error-terms obtained on both the TSE and the U.S. 
exchanges, the correlation coefficient might indicate to which extent the shock travelled from 
one stock exchange to another. 
 
The control stocks used in the second part of the analysis were selected to match my sample 
of stocks based on the following minimizing function: 
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Where and represent the measure of Parkinson volatility for the stocks of the main 
 
 
sample and for all the Canadian stocks quoted on the TSE that are not listed on a U.S. exchange. 
 
The other part of the minimizing function takes into account the level of liquidity, and 
 
 
giving the trading volume for each group of stocks. Data from every trading sessions on April 
2013 prior to the event day was used in order to compute this matching minimizing function. 





I use the high-low volatility measure created by Parkinson in 1980 to assess whether 
the cross-listed stocks are more affected by the arrival of the news announcement or not. I 
believe that using extreme values in measuring the volatility of the sample will prove to be a 
better estimator in the natural experiment I study. Furthermore, this approach proves to be 
more practical when looking at small number of observations. 
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The summary statistics of the thirty eight companies included in the cross-listed stocks 
sample are reported in Table I. The four digit SIC codes indicate that approximately 29% of 
the companies in that sample belongs to the mining industry sector (SIC code from 1000 to 
1499), 26% to the manufacturing industry sector (SIC code from 2000 to 3999) while 21% of 
it is from the transportation-communication-electricity-gas-retail trade industries (SIC code 
from 4000 to 5999). Finally, the remaining 24% of the sample represents firms from the 
finance-insurance-real estate industry sector (SIC code from 6000 to 6999). 
 












In Table II, I examine the price formation and liquidity of the sample of stocks following 
the news announcement of 13:07 p.m. on the exchanges they are listed on in both countries. It 
is immediately apparent that the main sample of stocks’ price change, trading volume and 
bid-ask spread adjustments to the news announcement are very similar on both the TSE and 
on the U.S. exchanges as shown on Figure 1 and 2. 
 
Following the release of the phony tweet, the main sample of stocks experiences a sudden 
negative price change along with a surge in trading volume and a widening of the bid-ask 
spread. In less than three minutes, the trading volume is respectively multiplied by seven and 





seven minutes before it resumes its monthly average level. Unsurprisingly, it stabilizes at exact 
same time on both exchanges. The same cannot be said for the liquidity. Indeed, while the trading 
volume activity goes back to normal shortly after the news announcement on the U.S. exchanges, 
it remains far above its monthly average for more than sixty minutes on the TSE. 
 
Similarly, the bid-ask spread on both markets remain significantly higher than normal for the 
most part of the end of the trading day. Most likely, marketmakers need time to adjust to the 
panic and the large movements of trade caused by the news announcement and since the 
shock emanated from the United-States, it may take them more time to adjust their inventory. 
Dealing with public information, I assume that the widening of the spread and the time it 
takes to adjust afterward are not related to marketmakers risking to face informed traders and 

















I further investigate the dynamics of price formation, liquidity and bid-ask spread for 
a sample of cross-listed mining stocks which is described in Table IV. I expect the cross-




















In Table III, I observe similar patterns across the two markets for the cross-listed 
mining stocks than the cross-listed stocks except for a positive surge in log return instead of a 
negative one. It appears that the bid-ask spreads are not as affected by the news 
announcement as for the cross-listed stocks while there is still a clear disruption of liquidity. 
We could argue that it is precisely due to the fact that the stocks belong to the mining 
industry. As reported in Table V, I find a significant negative relationship almost equal to -1 
(-0.905 at 1% level of significance on the TSE and -0.934 on the U.S. exchanges) between 











Regarding the findings on the intraday analysis of price formation and liquidity, one 
possible and convincing explanation is that investors moved from what they perceived as 
 
“newly” risky equity positions to safer ones; gold and silver for instance. It is therefore not 
surprising to find a negative relationship between the main sample and the sub-sample price 
change response to the announcement of the news. 
 
To explore this explanation even further, I examine the nature of the trade orders received by 







 average ratio of sell orders over buy orders is 0.892 between 10:15 a.m.8 and 13:06 p.m., it almost 
doubles around 13:15 p.m. to reach 1.683. These results highlight a significant increase in the 
number of sell orders shortly after the shock occurred. It is therefore safe to assume that following 











B.  Cross-market correlation 
 
 
In addition to observing the intraday pattern of the price formation and liquidity 
following the news announcement, part of my analysis is to measure the cross-market 
correlation between the price series of each exchanges. Acknowledging the rather high 
correlation existing between Canada and the United-States, I am interested in analysing how 
this correlation is affected by the news announcement. 
 
In addition to the correlation coefficients displayed in Table VI which represent the correlation 
between the main sample of stocks and the sub-sample of stocks across ten-minute time periods 
before and after the news announcement, Table V reports the correlation coefficients in returns 
(R²) across thirty-minute time periods on the event day and each day of the week that preceded the 
event day in April, 2013, also to control for the “day of the week” effect. I use thirty-minute time 








 Harris (1986) demonstrates that most of the stock price movements happen within the first 





in correlation. The mean and the median are obtained using all trading days in April, 2013, 
prior to the event day. 
 
Overall, the correlation in returns between the two markets is high in stable period (i.e. before 
the event day) and reach a correlation level almost equal to 1 on the event day in the thirty 
minutes time period in which the news announcement was released compared to a mean of 
0.889. This increase of 11.72% in R² suggests that the transmission mechanism strengthened 
and according to Forbes and Rigobon9, it might even be referred to as contagion. 
 
I also use a different approach to test for the strength of the transmission mechanism and as a 
robustness test. I suppose that by regressing the returns on the event day with the returns on a 
stable day it might capture the strength of the shock that occurred. Thus I obtain the error 
terms from regressions on both the Canadian and the U.S. markets and decide to regress each 
series of error terms in order to find how strongly the shock was transmitted. 
 
The results of these regressions are displayed in Table VII and tend to support the notion of 
contagion. We find a significant 0.8953 R² on the week before the shock occurred. We also 
note that the correlation is higher when regressing price returns on the same day of the week 

















 Forbes and Rigobon (2002) use cross-market correlation coefficients methodology to test for 
contagion. They acknowledge contagion only if there is a significant increase in correlation in 





C.  Comparison between main sample and control stocks 
 
 
Some will argue that these results are somewhat not surprising given the nature of the 
sample of stocks and the level of integration between the two financial markets we are 
focusing on. 
 
Therefore, I use control stocks in order to see how similar stocks listed on the TSE react to the 
news announcement. To be included in the control stocks sample, I make sure that these stocks 
are not listed on any U.S. exchange and share similar market capitalization, trading volume and 
price volatility. A descriptive summary of the control stocks is given in Table IX. In Table VIII, it 
is interesting to note that in terms of mean, the price volatility for the main sample of stocks 
increased while it decreased for the control stocks. In terms of median, which in this case, ignores 
large price movements, the volatility remains almost the same for the main sample of stocks while 
it also decreased of the control stocks which I associate to the fact that the firms are listed on U.S. 
exchanges as well. In light of these findings, it appears that the stocks which reacted the most 
strongly to the phony news announcement are the Canadian cross-listed stocks. Not only did the 
volatility increased (both in terms of mean and median) for the cross-listed stocks, we observe a 
decrease in volatility for the rest of their controls. It could very well be that investors paid less 











The average market capitalization for the control stocks is smaller than the sample of stocks. 
It is explained by the fact that out of thirty-eight stocks included in the main sample, twenty 




capitalization size parameter from the matching function in order to focus on volatility and 
liquidity which are more relevant in our analysis. Moreover, we know for a fact that most of 
the largest Canadian firms are also listed on a U.S. exchange, which would have put a serious 
limitation on the quality of the control stocks since it would prove nearly impossible to find 





D.  Other variable 
 
 
I am also interested in the level of financial and economical involvement of the Canadian 
firms present in the sample on the U.S. ground. I would expect Canadian firms with no 
activities (manufacturing, facilities, and employees) to be relatively safer from a shock 
occurring in the United-States. However, the annual reports and the financial quarter reports 
of the firms in the sample reveal that about a third of these firms have little or close to no 
activities in the United-States. These findings support the hypothesis that the surge in log 
price return and trading volume experienced by the samples on April 23, 2013, are partially 
































In this paper, I examined the intraday patterns of price formation and liquidity across a sample of 
Canadian stocks listed on both the TSE and the major U.S. exchanges with the occurrence of a 
shock originating from the foreign market. I find an instantaneous and highly correlated price log 
return surge along with a disruption of liquidity and a widening of the spreads. This answer to the 
release of phony public information lasts no more than a few minutes before the price log returns 
resume their daily average level on both markets. However, it appears that marketmakers may 
need more time to adjust their inventory, resulting in persistence of a wide bid-ask spread which 
almost last one hour after the news announcement which can also be explained by a persisting 
higher liquidity than normal. The comparison with a sample of control stocks, in addition to the 
almost total absence of economic and financial activities based in the United-States for some of 
the Canadian firms, highly suggest that the transmission mechanism of the shock was amplified 
through their cross-listed stocks on the U.S. exchanges. Regarding these results, firms may have 
to take into consideration this risk when making the decision of listing in a foreign market. 
Investors and the stock markets themselves are also entitled to become more aware of this 
disadvantage, given the ever increasing level of integration of the world economies and the 
growing concerns about the repetition of cyber-attacks. 
 
I also recognize that my analysis has some limitations. Indeed, it relies on a sample providing 
a perfect overlap between the two markets, markets which are highly integrated. It would be 
interesting to see how a sample of European or Asian stocks which are cross-listed on U.S. 
exchanges adjusts to a shock similar to the one we observed in this paper. Since the European 
markets share a few overlapping hours with the U.S. exchanges, would the transmission 
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